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This issue was preserved in the motion for review to the Labor Commission. (R.
00446-68.)
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2.

Whether the Court of Appeals should re-weigh evidence of medical and legal

causation where the Labor Commission made factual findings of no legal causation and no
medical causation and Utah law provides thai findings of fact made by the Commission after
weighing competing testimony and evidence are conclusive on the courts.
Standard of Review: Complete deference to the Labor Commission's findings of no
legal or medical causation. Where conflicting opinions on causation are presented to the
Labor Commission and a finding on causation is made by the Commission, Utah appellate
courts do not re-weigh evidence or substitute their opinion for that of the Labor Commission;
rather, the court defers to the Labor Commission's findings. See Tintic Standard Mining Co.
v. Industrial Comm'n. 110 P.2d 367, 368-69 (Utah 1941); Wherritt v. Industrial Comm'n.
110 P.2d 374,376 (Utah 1941); Staker v. Industrial Comm'n. 209 P. 880, 882 (Utah 1922).
This issue was preserved in the motion for review to the Labor Commission. (R.
00446-68.)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Utah Administrative Code R602-2-1.H. (October 1997), Addendum A
Utah Administrative Code R602-2-1.H (2000), Addendum B.
Utah Code Section 63-46b-7, Addendum C.
Utah Administrative Code R602-2-1.F., Addendum D.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner Martha Casper seeks workers' compensation death benefits as a result of
the death of her former husband, C. Lynn Barraclough. Mr. Barraclough died two days after
suffering a heart attack while operating a truck for Respondent Andrus Transportation. Mr.
Baraclough's death was not, however, caused by, or a result of, his employment. Rather, the
medical expert opinions weighed by the Labor Commission overwhelmingly indicated that
Mr. Barraclough's death was the result of a pre-existing heart condition.
During the administrative process, Ms. Casper served requests for admission. The
requests for admission were responded to by Respondent, but not within the 30 day
requirement of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 36 that would strictly apply in a civil judicial
proceeding. Rather, because of longstanding Utah law adopting the informality principle of
administrative law, Utah statutory law directing that administrative discovery is relaxed and
the Labor Commission is not bound by any formal rules or procedure (including the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure), because of an administrative rule permitting interrogatories but
not requests for admission, and in light of the a statutory mandate to carry out the spirit of
the Workers' Compensation Act by deciding cases on the merits, and not through technical
procedural vehicles, the Labor Commission refused to deem admitted the untimely responses
to Ms. Casper's requests for admission. Ms. Casper complains that she is entitled to benefits
because of this; Respondent maintains that this was not an abuse of discretion.
In deciding the case on the merits, the Administrative Law Judge held an
administrative hearing.

At the hearing, opinions of several competing experts were
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introduced and considered. Initial findings of fact on causation were made by the ALJ, but
because of the competing medical opinions, the matter was remanded by the Commission to
obtain advice from a medical panel on the issue of causation. The medical panel concluded
that Mr. Barraclough's employment with Andrus was not the cause of his heart attack and
death; rather, his heart attack and death was a result of a pre-existing heart condition. On
remand, the ALJ analyzed the evidence, considered the opinions from the competing experts,
took into account the opinion of no causation from the medical panel, and concluded that
there was no causal link. Following a motion for review from Ms. Casper, the Labor
Commission affirmed.
Ms. Casper continues to disagree with the no causation finding, complaining about
the relative weight given to the competing medical expert opinions by the Commission. The
instant Petition for Review to this Court is simply another attempt to have the evidence reweighed. It is improper for Ms. Casper to ask this Court to re-weigh evidence, and it is
unnecessary for this Court to do so. Appellate courts do not re-weigh evidence or findings
of fact made by the Labor Commission after the Commission has weighed competing
authorities on conflicting evidence. Moreover, re-weighing the evidence simply confirms
that the decision of no causation made by the Commission was correct and not an abuse of
discretion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. C. Lynn Barraclough ("Mr. Barraclough") suffered a heart attack while driving
truck for Defendant Andrus Trucking Services ("Andrus" or "Respondent") on November

4

19, 1996; he died two days later. (R. 00618; 00441; 00405.) 1 Mr. Barraclough's widow,
Petitioner Martha Casper ("Petitioner" or "Ms. Casper")2 filed her Application for Hearing
(the initial pleading that is somewhat analogous to a complaint in the civil judicial context)
in October 1997, seeking medical expenses, dependents benefits, and burial expenses due to
the death of her husband. (R. 0001; see also 00618; 00441; 00405.) Ms. Casper alleges that
Mr. Barraclough's death was caused by his work at Andrus. (Id.) Andrus maintains that Mr.
Barraclough's death was neither caused by, nor arose out of, his employment; but was a
result of a longstanding preexisting condition. (R. 00091-94; 00252-57; 00469-96.)
In the administrative proceeding, Ms. Casper's first set of requests for admission were
served even before Respondents filed their Answer, and therefore before an attorney
planning would have taken place had this matter been a civil suit as opposed to an
administrative claim. The first set of requests for admission were served on December 12,
1997. (R. 00087-90.) Respondents' Answer to the Application for Hearing was filed six
days later, on December 18,1997. (R. 00091-94.) Obviously no attorney planning meeting
had taken place prior to the service of the requests for admission as an answer had not yet
1

The citations to factual findings in the record are to the following: (1) Labor
Commission's March 21, 2007 "Order Affirming ALJ's Decision (R. 00618-00622); (2)
the ALJ's July 18, 2005 "Findings of Fact" (R. 00405-00412); and the ALJ's August 27,
2004 "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order." .(R. 00441-00445). This is
because the final the Labor Commission's "Order Affirming ALJ's Decision," adopt[ed]
[Administrative Law] Judge George's findings of fact," (R.00619), and the "Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order," of Administrative Law Judge George
"incorporated by reference the August 27, 2004 Preliminary Findings of Fact. (R.
00443.)
2

Petitioner advised the Court that she remarried on February 17, 2001, after filing
her Application for Hearing seeking workers' compensation benefits. (R. 00326.)
5

been filed, and even if an answer had been filed there had been no equivalent of a Rule 26(f)
conference would have begun the time for discovery. The second set of requests for
admission were filed nearly a year and a half later on April 20, 1999. (R. 001 88-90.) The
requests for admission were responded to by Andrus, but not within the 30 day requirement
imposed by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 36 that would strictly apply in a civil judicial
proceeding. Respondents responded to the first set dated December 12, 1997, on March 6,
1998 (R. 00108-114), and to the second set dated April 20, 1999, on May 26, 1999 (R.
00200-02.)
A two-day administrative hearing was held on September 11 and 12,2000. (R. 00618;
00406.)) At issue was, inter alia, whether Mr. Barraclough's death arose out of, and in the
course and scope of, his employment. After receiving evidence from both sides, the ALJ
weighed the evidence and found that "Mr. Barraclough's work at Andrus was neither the
legal cause nor the medical cause of his heart attack." (R. 00618.)
At the hearing, Mr. Barraclough's death was described as occurring while he was
driving. He left St. George on a solo drive, experienced chest pains, called his doctor and
his wife, and communicated to the Andrus dispatcher that he was returning to the Andrus
facility. (R. 00342; 00409.) 3 When Mr. Barraclough never returned to the yard, Andrus
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References to both the ALJ's July 31, 2003 "Findings of Fact Conclusions of
Law and Order" made before the matter was remanded for submission to a medical panel,
and the ALJ's August 27, 2004 "Findings of Fact" provided to the medical panel are
provided inasmuch as the July 31, 2003 Findings are identical to those of August 27,
2004 with the exception of one paragraph in which the ALJ initially concluded after the
hearing but before submission to the medical panel, that Mr. Barraclough had a
(continued...)
6

employees left to find him off the road in a ditch. (R. 00345; 00409.) Ambulance personnel
were summoned who then took Mr. Barraclough to the hospital where he died two days later.
(R. 00345; 00409.)
Evidence was introduced at the hearing demonstrating that Mr. Barraclough's death
was neither caused by, nor arose out of, his employment, but was a result of a longstanding
preexisting condition. The evidence first outlined Mr. Barraclough's prior history of heart
problems: (1) on August 17, 1995, Mr. Barraclough presented to Dr. Moore with numbness
on the left side of his body, (R. 00342; 00406); John Bell, a friend of Mr. Barraclough,
testified that Mr. Barraclough told him (Mr. Bell) that Mr. Barraclough would get chest pains
and numbness on his left side, (R. 00342; 00406); Mr. Bell also testified that he observed Mr.
Barraclough experience chest pains. (R. 00342-43; 00406-07.)
Expert opinions were also introduced at the hearing to address the issue of causation
(i.e., whether Mr. Barraclough's death arose both out of, and in the course of, his
employment).

Ms. Casper's expert, Dr. Frank Yanowitz, noted that Mr. Barraclough

"suffered a cardiac arrest secondary to an acute myocardial infarction while on his job
driving an 18-wheeler truck" (R. 00346; 00410.) Dr. Yanowitz opined that "[i]t is likely that
the anxiety and stress of having to drive solo for the first time contributed to the timing of
[Mr. Barraclough's] fatal coronary event, although this is very hard to prove." (R. 00346;
00410.) On the other hand, Dr. Todd Grey, the medical examiner/pathologist retained by
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(...continued)
preexisting degenerative cardiac condition, a conclusion that was left to be decided by the
medical panel on remand. (Compare R. 00342-49 with R. 00405-12.)
7

Andrus, also noted that Mr. Barraclough suffered a heart attack. Dr. Grey went on to
explain, however, why the heart attack did not arise out of, and in the course and scope of,
employment. Dr. Grey explained that the most common cause of a heart attack is the
hardening and narrowing of the arteries slowly over time over a period of years or decades,
(R. 00347; 00410-11), pointed out that Mr. Barraclough had experienced chest pains in the
days prior to his heart attack, (R. 00347; 00411), and opined that "the underlying pathology
(occlusion of the coronary arteries) is a condition which had been developing for many years
and cannot be ascribed to [Mr. Barraclough's] employment as a truck driver." (R. 00347;
00411, quoting Report of Dr. Gray.) Additional evidence presented to the ALJ included the
opinion of Dr. Joseph Perry, a cardiologist, who stated that Mr. Barraclough's employment
"had no relationship to the development of coronary atherosclerosis, which was the disease
responsible for his demise," and he found "no relationship between [Mr. Barraclough's]
employment and his demise." (R. 00669:0001.) A psychiatrist retained by Andrus, Dr.
David McCann, further opined that Mr. Barraclough's injuries did not arise out of or as a
result of his employment. Dr. McCann explained that the medical records provided a clear
description of a man who was feeling progressively ill, and that the belief that Mr.
Barraclough was stressed by the job was not supported by any evidence. (R. 00347; 00411).
These facts were findings made by the Administrative Law Judge on two separate occasions.
(Compare R. 00342-49 with R. 00405-12.)
Based upon this evidence, the ALJ found that Mr. Barraclough's death did not arise
out of, and in the course of, his employment. The ALJ explained that Mr. Barraclough had
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a "pre-existing, degenerative cardiac condition, coronary artery atherosclerosis, which
culminated in his [heart attack] and ultimately his demise." (R. 00348.) The ALJ went on
to conclude that Ms. Casper failed to prove that Mr. Barraclough's heart attack was caused
by his work, and therefore dismissed Ms. Casper's claims. (R. 00348-49.)
Petitioner filed an administrative motion for review seeking review of the ALJ's
decision by the Labor Commission. (R. 00354-68.) Her argument was that the ALJ did not
give proper weight to the medical expert's opinions and conclusions, as her motion praised
the opinions of Ms. Casper's experts and criticized the opinions of Andrus' experts. For
example, Petitioner praised Dr. Yanowitz's "well-reasoned" report that it was "likely" that
the anxiety caused the heart attack, (R. 00360-61), while criticizing Dr. Joseph Perry's
conclusion that Mr. Barraclough's "employment had no relationship to the development of
coronary atherosclerosis which was the disease process responsible for his demise." (R.
00361.) Petitioner also criticized Dr. Grey's opinion that the underlying cause of the heart
attack was developed over a number of years and could not be ascribed to Mr. Barraclough's
employment. (R. 00361.) After praising and criticizing the opinions of these competing
experts, Petitioner claimed that she established both medical and legal causation, insisting
that the opinions of Andrus' medical experts were "not persuasive," and that despite the
conclusions that there was no causal link, such reports should "carry little weight"

(R.

00365-66.) Andrus opposed this first motion for review, pointing out that the ALJ weighed
the evidence as the factfinder and correctly determined that Ms. Casper failed to prove that
Mr. Barraclough's death arose out of, and in the course of, his employment. (R. 00377-85.)
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Because the ALJ concluded there was no causal link without consulting a medical
panel, the Labor Commission remanded the matter to the ALJ to reconsider the issues of
medical and legal causation, instructing the ALJ to obtain an opinion from a medical panel.
(R. 0388-90.)

In remanding the matter, the Commission addressed the requests for

admission, rejecting Ms. Casper's request to deem them admitted stating, "The Commission
accepts [the ALJ's] tacit ruling that the connection between Mr. Barraclough's work and his
death should be decided according to the evidence actually presented by the parties." (R.
00389.) The Commission instructed the ALJ to issue a new decision after obtaining the
medical panel's report. (R. 00390.)

The Commission ordered the medical panel review

because of the "express contrary [medical] opinions/' and the "significant conflict in the
medical evidence." (R. 00389.)
As instructed, the ALJ appointed a medical panel. (R. 00402.) The medical panel
considered and weighed the competing opinions of Drs. Moore, Yanowitz, Perry, and Gray.
(R. 00419-24.) The medical panel concluded that Mr. Barraclough's heart attack was caused
by a preexisting condition, stating as follows: "The decedent suffered from a medical
condition that was pre-existent to the events of 11/19/96. This condition contributed to a
myocardial infarction, cardiac arrest, and cerebral anoxia." (R. 00418.) The medical panel
also specifically concluded that Mr. Barraclough's employment at Andrus was not the
medical cause of his cardiac arrest and death. (R. 00418.) In response to the question "Did
the decedent's employment activities with Andrus Transportation Services, Inc. medically
cause his cardiac arrest and death?", the medical panel responded, "No." (R. 00419.)
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Ms. Casper objected to the medical panel report, claiming the panel "engag[ed] in
speculation," (R. 00426), but at the same time admitting that conflicting medical evidence
existed. (R. 00429.) Ms. Casper even submitted a supplemental report of Dr. Yanowitz and
asked for permission to cross examine the medical panel. (R. 00435,00432.) Respondents
opposed the motion. (R. 00438.)
After receiving the medical panel report and Ms. Casper's objection, the ALJ issued
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. (R. 00441.) The ALJ noted that Ms.
Casper's objections simply went "to the weight the report should be given," and not to
whether it was properly part of the record. (R. 00442.) The ALJ then went on to adopt the
medical panel's finding that Mr. Barraclough's death was not causally related to his
employment with Andrus Transportation. (R. 00443.) As a result, the ALJ concluded that
Applicant "failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a medical causal
connection exists between the decedent's cardiac arrest and his work activities." (R. 00444.)
Ms. Casper sought administrative review from the Labor Commission. Ms. Casper
argued that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure should have been strictly applied in the
administrative process, and asserted that she was entitled to recover because Andrus
answered requests for admission late. (R. 00452.) She also took issue with the medical
records and opinions, (R. 00453-57), claimed that her objections to the medical panel must
not have been considered, (R. 00458), asked for reconsideration of conflicting medical
evidence, (R. 00460), and reasserted an entitlement to cross examine the medical panel. (R.
00464.) Respondents opposed the motion, setting forth the facts with citations to the record,
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(R. 00470-81), referencing the medical opinions, and pointing out that Ms. Casper had the
burden of proving both medical and legal causation under Utah workers' compensation law.
(R. 00481-82.) Respondents pointed out that Ms. Casper failed to prove legal causation (R.
00483), and that she also failed to prove medical causation. (R. 00486) Respondents also
explained why Ms. Casper's request for strict application of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure in the administrative process was contrary to Utah law.

(R. 00488-91.)

Respondents explained that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply in the same
manner in the administrative context as they do in civil judicial proceedings. (R. 00488)
Respondents pointed out that the Labor Commission's administrative rules did not provide
for requests for admission, that discovery is subject to limitations and not strictly applied in
the administrative arena, and that the administrative officer had discretion to modify how
discovery procedures and tools were used in the administrative process. (R. 00489-90.)
Respondents also explained that Ms. Casper's request to re-weigh the evidence yet again was
improper and unnecessary. (R. 00490.)
The Labor Commission affirmed the dismissal of Ms. Casper's petilion. (R. 00618.)
The Commission adopted the findings of fact made by the ALJ.

(PL. 00619.)

The

Commission confirmed the finding that Mr. Barraclough's death was not medically caused
or related to his employment. (R. 00619.) The Commission then went on to explain that Ms.
Casper did not prove legal causation, nor medical causation; and it therefore concluded that
she was not entitled to benefits. (R. 00620.) The Commission addressed a second time the
requests for admission, again rejecting Ms. Casper's request to deem them admitted. The
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Commission stated," The Commission has already considered and rejected this argument in
its previous Order Of Remand. Specifically, the Commission ruled that 'the connection
between Mr. Barraclough's work and his death should be decided according to the evidence
actually presented by the parties.' The Commission hereby reaffirms that ruling." (R. 0061920.)
The instant petition for review to this Court ensued. (R. 00623.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Petitioner Martha Casper insists that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure strictly apply
in the administrative process, and she asks that the Commission's decision be overturned
because she disagrees with the relative weight given by the Commission to the medical
opinions. (Pet. Br. at I, 1-2.) These arguments are contrary to Utah administrative law and
must be rejected for several reasons.
Ms. Casper first claims that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure strictly apply in the
administrative process. She asserts that because Respondents filed responses to requests for
admission late, that she is entitled to recover benefits as a matter of law. (Pet. Br. at 8-12.)
This position has no foundation in Utah law. There are several reasons why the Labor
Commission correctly refused to deem admitted requests for admission that were served as
part of the administrative discovery process. Each point is outlined in sections of the brief.
First, Petitioner misapprehends the nature of discovery in workers' compensation
proceedings. Utah Code Section 63-46b-7 does not stand for the proposition asserted by Ms.
Casper. To interpret the statute to impose strict, technical adherence to the rules of civil
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procedure in the administrative discovery process as proposed by Ms. Casper is contrary to
the "informality principle" adopted by Utah administrative law.
Second, it would have been contrary to Utah Code Section 34A-2-802 and Utah
administrative law to deem admitted the requests for admission. Utah Code Section 34A-2802 mandates that administrative discovery is specifically relaxed and that the Labor
Commission is not bound by any formal rules or procedure, including the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

To deem admitted requests for admission would contradict this statutory

mandate.
Third, the Commission is also statutorily mandated to decide cases in a way that
ascertains the substantial rights of the parties and carries out the spirit of the Workers'
Compensation Act. This spirit of the Act includes applying workers' compensation law in
accordance with the administrative informality principle and ensuring that cases are resolved
by proceedings on the merits, and not through technical procedural vehicles.
Fourth, Ms. Casper incorrectly asserts that requests for admission were proper
administrative discovery vehicles. No administrative rule has ever permitted the use of
requests for admission as administrative discovery methods in Labor Commission
administrative proceedings. The old rule permitted interrogatories; and administrative law
directs that where one discovery method is expressly permitted, other methods are thereby
prohibited. Therefore requests for admission have always been prohibited.

A new

administrative rule was promulgated to clarify this old rule. The new rule now expressly
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makes clear that requests for admission are prohibited. Because this new rule is a procedural
rule, it also applies retroactively to render the requests for admission invalid.
Fifth, even if the requests for admission were deemed admitted, they are not
determinative of the ultimate questions before the Commission. To recover, Ms. Casper was
required to prove two aspects of causation: (1) legal causation and (2) medical causation.
All that would be deemed admitted is that the heart attack occurred while Mr. Barraclough
was at work. This does not, however, establish that the work was a legal cause of the heart
attack, nor does it establish that the work was the medical reason for the heart attack. There
is no evidence that Mr. Barraclough's work was the reason for the heart attack; on the
contrary, the medical evidence is overwhelming that the heart attack was the result of a preexisting condition.
As her second argument, Ms. Casper also asks this Court to overturn the Labor
Commission's findings of no legal causation and no medical causation because she disagrees
with the relative weight given to the competing medical expert opinions on causation. (Pet.
Br. at 12-14.) This argument fails for two reasons.
First, it is improper for Ms. Casper to ask this Court to re-weigh evidence, and it is
unnecessary for this Court to do so. In reviewing a workers' compensation award, an
appellate court does not re-weigh the evidence. Longstanding Utah law directs that findings
of fact made by the Commission after weighing competing authorities on conflicting
evidence are conclusive on the courts. The Labor Commission's finding of no causation is
therefore conclusive on this Court.
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Second, re-weighing the evidence would simply validate the decision of the
Commission. The ALJ, and the Labor Commission both weighed the evidence and analyzed
opinion testimony from competing experts. After weighing this evidence, the ALJ and the
Labor Commission both correctly determined that Ms. Casper is not entitled to death benefits
as a result of Mr. Barraclough's death because she failed to establish that Mr. Barraclough's
death was legally and medically causally related to his employment. Mr. Barraclough's
death was a result of a pre-existing heart condition. The instant Petition for Review to this
Court is nothing more than another attempt to have the evidence re-weighed, evidence that
has already been carefully and thoroughly weighed by the ALJ on two occasions, and later
twice by the Labor Commission on administrative review. There has been no abuse of
discretion by the Labor Commission in reaching its finding of no causation.
As her final argument, Ms. Casper argues she should be awarded benefits because, she
insists, claims are to be "liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits." (Pet. Br. at 14.)
An injured worker is not compensated, however, for simply making a claim. Ms. Casper
fails to acknowledge that the workers' compensation statutory scheme is a contested one, and
that she failed to satisfy the statutory requirements of obtaining benefits. She failed to prove
both (1) legal causation and (2) medical causation. Ms. Casper did not demonstrate, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that she is entitled to benefits under the Act.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Labor Commission correctly concluded that the requests for admission were
not deemed admitted in the administrative arena
The Labor Commission correctly refused to deem admitted requests for admission that

were served in the administrative discovery process. Ms. Casper claims that the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure should strictly apply in the administrative discovery process. Ms. Casper
claims that Section 63-46b-7 should be interpreted to permit parties to serve requests for
admission, and that such discovery requests should be handled and applied in accordance
with all of the technical applications of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. She asserts that
because Respondents filed responses to requests for admission late, that she is entitled to
recover benefits as a matter of law. (Pet. Br. at 8-12.) Ms. Casper's argument fails for
several reasons. The reasons why the Labor Commission correctly refused to deem admitted
requests for admission are discussed in greater detail in the sections that follow.
A.

Rigid adherence to technical procedure is contrary to Utah administrative
law

It is important to set forth the context of discovery in the administrative arena. In
arguing for strict application of the Rules of Civil Procedure in a Labor Commission
administrative proceeding, Ms. Casper misapprehends the nature of discovery in workers'
compensation proceedings.

Matters before the Labor Commission are administrative

proceedings, not adversarial judicial proceedings. "Rigid adherence to judicial procedures
in administrative proceedings is generally inappropriate because it ignores basic differences
between judicial and administrative procedures." Pilcherv. Dep't of Social Servs., 663 P.2d
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450, 453 (Utah 1983). Because administrative proceedings and judicial proceedings are
fundamentally different, "[Labor Commission] [administrative proceedings are usually
conducted with greater flexibility and informality than judicial proceedings." See Pilcherv.
Dep't of Social Servs., 663 P.2d450,453 (Utah 1983). "While the mode of procedure before
administrative bodies may conform to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the rules governing
civil procedure in the trial courts are not necessarily applicable to administrative
proceedings."

Pilcher v. Dep't of Social Servs., 663 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1983).

Accordingly, the discovery rules found in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply in
administrative matters in the same manner that they apply in civil judicial proceedings. A
leading treatise on Workers' Compensation makes clear that the purpose of the
administrative process is to avoid the procedures and technicalities of the judicial process in
favor of reaching a right decision in an expeditious manner. See generally 3 Arthur Larson
& Lex K. Larson, Larson's Worker's Compensation § 124.01, "Informality Principle
Summarized" (Desk Ed. 2007). Pursuant to the administrative informality principle, "cases
should be resolved by proceedings on the merits, and not through technical procedural
vehicles." Id. (citing Israel v. Indus. Comm'n, 669 P.2d 102 (Ariz. 1983)). This principle
supports deciding the case on the merits and refusing to strictly apply procedural civil
discovery rules. The Labor Commission explained this to Ms. Casper on the two occasions
when it rejected her requests to deem admitted the requests for admission. (R. 00388, Order
of Remand, noting that the ALJ did not impute any admission to Andrus, required the parties
to present their evidence on causation, and accepting the ALJ's ruling "that the connection
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between Mr. Barraclough's work and his death should be decided according to the evidence
actually presented by the parties"; R. 00619, Order Affirming ALJ's Decision, reiterating that
'the connection between Mr. Barraclough's work and his death should be decided according
to the evidence actually presented by the parties'").
B.

Utah Code Section 34A-2-802 directs that discovery before the Labor
Commission is relaxed, and therefore strict adherence to the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure would be improper

It would have been improper and contrary to Utah Code Section 34A-2-802 and the
informality principle of Utah administrative law for the ALJ or the Commission to deem
admitted the requests for admission. Discovery before the Labor Commission is specifically
relaxed and limited pursuant to Utah Code Section 34A-2-802. This statute provides that the
Labor Commission is not bound by any formal rules or procedure, including the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. It reads: "The commission, . . . an administrative law judge, or the
Appeals Board is not bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of evidence or by
any technical or formal rules or procedure . • • . The Commission may make its
investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial
rights of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 34A2-802 (2007) (emphasis added). Because discovery in workers' compensation proceedings
is not bound by the strict rules of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants' failure to
timely respond does not require that the requests for admission be deemed admitted, and it
would have been improper for the ALJ or the Commission to strictly apply the rules of civil
procedure and deem admitted the requests for admission. The application of this statute is
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supported by Utah Code Section 63-46b-7(3): "Nothing in this section precludes any
investigative right or power given to an agency by another statute." As a result, it was well
within the administrative officer's discretion to decide the case on the merits.
C,

The Labor Commission was obligated to hear the matter on the merits
and therefore had discretion to disregard the requests for admission

Administrative officers are given broad discretion in administrative discovery matters.
It was well within the administrative officer's discretion to hear and resolve Ms. Casper's
claim on the merits, as opposed to through technical procedural vehicles such as requests for
admission. In addition to making clear that the Labor Commission is not bound by any
formal rules of civil procedure, Section 34A-2-802 also directs that discovery may be
modified as necessary by the presiding administrative officer. It reads: "The commission,
. . . an administrative law judge, or the Appeals Board is not bound by the usual common law
or statutory rules of evidence or by any technical or formal rules or procedure . . . . The
Commission may make its investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best
calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly the
spirit of the chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-802 (2007) (emphasis added); cf. Joseph
v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 2002 UT App 254, 53 P.3d 11 (discussing discretion
of administrative agency for imposing sanctions for failures to respond to administrative
discovery requests).
This statute authorizes the Labor Commission to oversee the administrative discovery
process and modify it as necessary in order to "carry out justly the spirit of the chapter." This
spirit of the chapter undoubtedly includes applying workers' compensation law in accordance
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with the informality principle and ensuring that cases are resolved by proceedings on the
merits, and not through technical procedural vehicles. See, e.g., Pilcher v. Dep't of Social
Servs., 663 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1983) (explaining that because administrative proceedings
and judicial proceedings are fundamentally different, administrative proceedings are usually
conducted with greater flexibility and informality, and that the rules governing civil
procedure in the trial courts are not necessarily applicable to administrative proceedings); 3
Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Worker's Compensation § 124.01 (2007)
(explaining that the informal nature of the administrative process is to avoid the procedures
and technicalities of the judicial process in favor of reaching a right decision in an
expeditious manner). This further supports the decision of the Labor Commission to refuse
to deem admitted the requests for admission.
An administrative agency has discretion to sanction a party for willfulness or dilatory
tactics in responding to discovery requests. See Joseph v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 2002 UT App 254, f 11, 53 P.3d 11. It likewise follows that the administrative
agency has discretion not to sanction a party. Id. No findings of willfulness or persistent
dilatory tactics were made in the instant case by the ALJ or the Commission. Rather, the
Commission twice rejected Ms. Casper's request to deem admitted the requests for
admission, in both its Order of Remand and final Order Affirming the ALJ's Decision. (R.
00388; R. 00619.) In light of Utah law regarding administrative discovery, it was certainly
not an abuse of discretion by the Commission to refuse to deem admitted the requests for
admission. Rather, it was proper to have decided the case on the merits.
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The Commission explained this to Ms. Casper on both occasions when it rejected Ms.
Casper's request to deem admitted the requests for admission. The Commission stated," The
Commission has already considered and rejected this argument in its previous Order Of
Remand.

Specifically, the Commission ruled that

c

the connection between Mr.

Barraclough's work and his death should be decided according to the evidence actually
presented by the parties.' The Commission hereby reaffirms that ruling." (R. 389 (Order of
Remand); 00619-20 (Order Affirming ALJ's Decision).)

These two rulings are in

accordance with the Commission's statutory mandate of Section 34A-2-802 to "ascertain the
substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the chapter." Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-2-802 (2007)
Additionally, Ms. Casper comes to this court asking for strict compliance with the
rules of civil procedure with unclean hands. The first set of requests for admission were
improper given the fact that no responsive pleading or answer had been filed as of the date
when the requests for admission were served. The first set of requests for admission were
served on December 12, 1997. Respondents' Answer to the Application for Hearing was
filed six days later, on December 18, 1997. If administrative law were to strictly apply the
rules of civil procedure, no attorney planning meeting had taken place such that requests for
admission could have been served. Even under a strict compliance theory, Ms. Casper has
unclean hands because the first set of requests for admission were improper.4
4

On this point of unclean hands, it is also worth noting the timing by which Ms.
Casper responded to interrogatories from Andrus. In the civil context, failure to respond
to interrogatories as opposed to requests for admission carry different ramifications.
However, the unclean hands of Ms. Casper is demonstrated by the following facts:
(continued...)
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In short, discovery in workers' compensation proceedings is not bound by the strict
mles of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Based upon this authority, the ALJ and

Commission properly concluded that the issues of legal and medical causation should he
decided on their merits. (See R. 00389, Order of Remand at p.2, ("The Commission accepts
[the ALJ's] tacit ruling that the connection between Mr. Barraclough's work and his death
should be decided according to the evidence actually presented by the parties.")); Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-2-802 (2005); Utah Administrative Code R602-2-1.N. (2005).
D.

Administrative discovery methods are only available to the extent
permitted by statute or agency rules, and where the governing statute or
agency rule does not expressly permit a method of discovery, that method
is prohibited

Utah Code Section 63-46b-7 does not permit requests for admission in a Labor
Commission administrative matter as claimed by Ms. Casper. Rather, Section 63-46b-7
states that the administrative "agency may, by rule, prescribe means for discovery[.]" §6346b-7(l) (2007). If the agency does not enact rules, the parties may conduct discovery
according to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. IcL The Labor Commission has enacted
discovery rules.

Copies of these administrative discovery rules are attached.

(Utah

Administrative Code R602-2-1.H. (October 1997), Exhibit A; Utah Administrative Code
R602-2-1 .H (2000), Exhibit B; Utah Administrative Code R602-2-1 .F., Exhibit D.) For the

4

(... continued)
Andrus served its first set of interrogatories on February 3, 1998, to which Ms. Caper
responded late, 42 days later on March 17, 1998 (0098-101); and Andrus served its
second set of interrogatories on September 10, 1998, to which Ms. Casper responded late,
more than 7 months later on April 15, 1999. (R. 00179-81; 00186-87.)
23

reasons outlined below, no Labor Commission administrative discovery rule has ever
permitted requests for admission.

Rather, requests for admission have always been

prohibited.
Discovery methods are only permitted if expressly allowed, and only to the extent
permitted, otherwise they are prohibited. Legislation or administrative regulations may set
forth how discovery rules may apply in the administrative context. See Pilcher v. Dep't of
Social Servs., 663 P.2d 450,453 (Utah 1983) ("[Administrative proceedings are not subject
to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure unless the governing statute or regulations so provide.")
However, "[djiscovery in administrative proceedings is available only if governing statutes
or agency rules so provide." Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 916 P.2d 344, 35253 (Utah 1996). Administrative discovery vehicles are limited. "Insofar as the proceedings
of a state administrative body are concerned, only the methods of discovery set forth in the
pertinent statute are available, and methods not set forth therein are excluded." I d (quoting
73A CJ.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure § 124 (1983)). In other words,
discovery is available only to the extent permitted by the governing statute or agency rules,
and if the governing statute or agency rules do not expressly permit a method of discovery,
that method is prohibited. See id.
1.

Requests for admission have never been an administrative method
of discovery

Ms. Casper claims that the requests for admission filed in December 1997 were proper
under the administrative rule in effect at the time. She makes much of fact that the requests
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were served in 1997 and 1999, presumably attempting to avoid the current procedural rule
- that "[discovery shall not include requests for admissions." Utah Administrative Code
R602-2-1 .F., Exhibit D. Regardless, under either the current rule or the aile in effect in 1997
and 1999, requests for admission have never been permitted vehicles of administrative
discovery in Labor Commission proceedings.
(a)

In permitting interrogatories but not mentioning requests
for admission, the old rule thereby prohibited requests for
admission

Prior Administrative Rule R602-2-1 .F., the rule at the time the requests for admission
were propounded, did not provide for requests for admission. The Labor Commission
discovery rule in effect in 1997 and 1999 reads as follows:
Upon filing of the Answer, the defendant may commence discovery with
appropriate sets of interrogatories. Such discovery should focus on the
accident event, witnesses, as well as past and present medical care. The
defendant shall also be entitled to appropriately signed medical releases to
allow gathering of pertinent medical records. The defendant may also require
the applicant to submit to a medical examination by a physician of the
defendant's choice. Failure of an applicant to comply with such requests may
result in the dismissal of a claim or a delay in the scheduling of a hearing.
(Utah Administrative Code R602-2-1.H. (October 1997), Exhibit A; Utah Administrative
Code R602-2-1.H (2000), Exhibit B.)5
In permitting interrogatories but not mentioning requests for admission, the rule
thereby prohibits requests for admission. This rule expressly permits interrogatories. It does

5

The language of the rule in effect in 1997 is identical to the language of the rule
in effect in 1999. Copies of the rule for verification of the identical language are attached
as Exhibits A and B.
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not even mention, however, much less authorize, requests for admission. As explained
previously, where an administrative rule sets forth methods of conducting administrative
discovery (i.e. interrogatories), any other methods not set forth in the rule (i.e. requests for
admission) are prohibited. See Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 916 P.2d 344,
352-53 (Utah 1996) (citing and quoting 73 A C. J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure
§ 1 2 4 (1983)). As a result, because requests for admission are not set forth in the rule,
requests for admission are prohibited.
Construing the rule to prohibit requests for admission is also consistent with the
informality principle of the administrative process. See Pitcher v. Dep't of Social Servs., 663
P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1983) (explaining that "[r]igid adherence to judicial procedures in
administrative proceedings is generally inappropriate because it ignores basic differences
between judicial and administrative procedures" and that "[administrative proceedings are
usually conducted with greater flexibility and informality than judicial proceedings."); see
generally 3 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Worker's Compensation § 124.01,
"Informality Principle Summarized" (Desk Ed. 2007).
(b)

The current Labor Commission administrative discovery
rule clarifies the prohibition on requests for admission

The current Labor Commission discovery rule expressly prohibits requests for
admission. Utah Administrative Code R602-2-1 .F. makes clear that requests for admission
are prohibited methods of administrative discovery:
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F. Discovery.
1. Upon filing the answer, the respondent and the petitioner may commence
discovery. Discovery allowed under this rule may include interrogatories,
requests for production of documents, depositions, and medical examinations.
Discovery shall not include requests for admissions. Appropriate discovery
under this rule shall focus on matters relevant to the claims and defenses at
issue in the case. All discovery requests are deemed continuing and shall be
promptly supplemented by the responding party as information comes
available.
(Emphasis added.)
The current rule was promulgated to clarify the old rule. As explained above, requests
for admission were not permitted methods of administrative discovery. The current rule
made this clear by adding the phrase, "Discovery shall not include requests for admissions."
Changes to procedural rules are applied retroactively.

See, e.g., Evans & Sutherland

Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax Common, 953 P.2d 435, 437-38 (Utah 1997). This is
especially true when amendments merely clarify an ambiguity, id. Where a statute or rule
"deals only with the clarification or amplification as to how the law should have been
understood prior to its enactment [or promulgation]," the rule is properly applied
retroactively. See Okland Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 520 P.2d 208, 210-11 (Utah
1974). Because requests for admission were not permitted methods of administrative
discovery under the old rule, and because the new rule's express prohibition simply clarifies
the old rule, the new rule applies retroactively in the instant case. As a result, the requests
for admission were expressly prohibited under the new rule.
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E.

Even if they were deemed admitted, the requests for admission do not
resolve legal and medical causation

Even if the requests for admission were deemed admitted, they are not dispositive of
the ultimate questions before the Commission. To recover, Ms. Casper was required to prove
two aspects of causation: (1) legal causation and (2) medical causation. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 34A-2-401 (2007); Allen v. Industrial Common, 729 P.2d 15, 25-27 (Utah 1986). This
two-part causal test must be proven to distinguish injuries which coincidentally occur at
work, injuries due to a preexisting condition that manifests itself at work, to ensure that
employers do not become a general insurer of employees, and to discourage fraudulent
claims. Allen, 729 P.2d at 25-27. Proving both legal and medical causation is the burden
of the applicant. In this case, Ms. Casper proved neither.
Petitioner propounded six requests for admission:
1. Admit that on or about November 19,1996, the Deceased was injured while
acting in the course and scope of employment;
2. Admit that the Applicant's claim is not barred by any applicable statute of
limitation.
(R. 00088.)
1. Admit that the Deceased's myocardial infarction occurred while he was
driving one of the Employer's trucks;
2. Admit that the Deceased's myocardial infarction occurred after he was
dispatched by the Employer to travel on a job or jobs for and/or at the direction
of the Employer;
3. Admit that the Deceased performed services for the Employer on the day
when his myocardial infarction occurred.
4. Admit that the Deceased's myocardial infarction occurred while the
employee was at work for the Employer.
(R. 00188-89.)
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Even assuming these requests as admitted, this does not resolve the dispute because
these requests are not determinative of both legal and medical causation that would permit
recovery by Ms. Casper as a matter of law. All that would be deemed admitted is that the
heart attack occurred while Mr. Barraclough was at work-in the course and scope of his
employment. It is not determinative that something about the work caused the accident either legally or medically. If it were deemed admitted that Mr. Barraclough was injured in
the course and scope of his employment, while driving an Andrus truck, after being
dispatched, performing services for Andrus, while at work, this does not establish the issues
of medical and legal causation. Just because the heart attack occurred while Mr. Barraclough
was on the job does not establish that the heart attack occurred because of the work. It also
does not establish medical causation and rule out the injury being the result of a preexisting
condition. Just because the heart attack occurred while Mr. Barraclough was in the course
and scope of his employment does not establish whether or not a preexisting medical
condition contributed to his death; nor does it establish whether or not the stress, strain, or
exertion of Mr. Barraclough's work at Andrus caused Mr. Barraclough's heart attack. All
that could be established by the requests for admission is that the heart attack occurred on the
job, and this does not resolve the issues of legal and medical causation.
These requests for admission, even if admitted, especially cannot satisfy, as a matter
of law, the medical causation requirement.

Indeed, on the merits, the medical panel

concluded that Mr. Barraclough's death was not medically linked to his work. Thus, even
if there were a finding of legal causation, Ms. Casper's appeal must fail on medical
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causation. The medical panel was asked: "Did the decedent's employment activities with
Andras Transportation Services, Inc. medically cause his cardiac arrest and death?" (R
00418.) The medical panel responded, "No." (Id.) Therefore, even if the requests for
admission were deemed admitted for legal causation purposes, the is no error by the
Commission in finding the medical panel to be credible and concluding that there is no
medical causation between Mr. Barraclough's death and his employment at Andrus.
II.

Petitioner failed to prove medical causation and legal causation
As her second argument, Ms. Casper asks this Court to overturn the Labor

Commission's findings of no legal causation and no medical causation because she disagrees
with the relative weight given to the competing medical expert opinions on causation. (Pet.
Br. at 12-14.) The reasons this argument fails are outlined below.
Ms. Casper failed to prove the required legal and medical causal links. For an injury
to be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, the injury must arise out of, and
in the course and scope of, employment. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (2007). The leading
case on causation in Utah workers' compensation jurisprudence, Allen v. Industrial Comm'n,
makes clear that a petitioner must prove both medical and legal causation. 729 P.2d 15, 2527 (Utah 1986) (adopting the two-part test of legal causation and medical causation from
Larson, Workmen's Compensation, (1986)). Ms. Casper proved neither, and her case was
properly dismissed.
Ms. Casper now disagrees with the relative weight given by the Commission to
competing medical opinions. Various medical opinions were provided by experts retained
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by both Petitioner and Respondents. Because of these competing experts, an independent
medical panel was appointed.

See, e.g., Utah Administrative Code 602-2-2 (2007);

Willardson v. Industrial Common of Utah, 904 P.2d 671 (Utah 1995). The independent
medical panel provided its opinion on causation - that Mr. Barraclough's heart attack and
demise was not causally related to his employment. The medical opinions of experts retained
by both sides, as well as the opinion of the medical panel, were thoroughly weighed by the
Administrative Law Judge, and later on administrative review by the Commission.
This Court need not re-weigh the evidence. Longstanding Utah law directs that
findings of fact made by the Commission after weighing competing authorities on conflicting
evidence are conclusive on the courts. The finding of no causation is therefore conclusive
on this Court.
Regardless, re-weighing the evidence simply validates the decision of the
Commission. After weighing the evidence, the Labor Commission correctly determined that
Ms. Casper is not entitled to death benefits because she failed to establish that Mr.
Barraclough's death was legally and medically causally related to his employment at Andrus.
Mr. Barraclough's death was a result of a pre-existing heart condition. Just because the
weight given to Ms. Casper's experts was not as she had hoped does not mean there is any
abuse of discretion by the Commission.
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A.

Causation findings by the Labor Commission are final and such fact
issues are not re-weighed by this Court

The Commission's findings on legal and medical causation are final, and it would be
contrary to precedent, as well as unnecessary, for this court to re-weigh the evidence and
substitute its judgement for the causation findings of the Commission. Utah law directs that
the Labor Commission is the ultimate factfinding authority for workers' compensation
proceedings. See, e.g., Speirs v. Southern Utah Univ., 2002 UT App 389, f[[ 10, 60 P.3d 42.
Additionally, it is not the task of an appellate court to re-weigh evidence in workers'
compensation proceedings and substitute its conclusion for that of Labor Commission.
Longstanding Utah law directs that where two or more "conflicting inferences" or opinions
are presented to the Commission on causation, and a finding on causation is made by the
Commission, Utah appellate courts do not re weigh evidence and do not "substitute [their]
opinion as to the preponderance of the evidence for that of the commission.'* Tintic Standard
Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 110 P.2d 367, 368-69 (Utah 1941); see also Wherritt v.
Industrial Comm'n, 110 P.2d 374, 376 (Utah 1941) (explaining that "[t]he burden of proof
is upon the applicant to establish her claim for compensation" and that "it is not [an appellate
court's] duty to say what inference or conclusion [it] would have drawn from the facts
presented tot he Commission"); Staker v. Industrial Comm'n, 209 P. 880, 882 (Utah 1922)
(refusing to disturb a causation finding where two physicians provided competing testimony
to the Commission, and for the court to substitute its findings for the Commission's would
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require the court to "usurp the functions of an administrative body [and require the court to]
determine the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses who testified'5).
Appellate courts should not be asked to re-weigh facts, especially when appellate
courts are not equipped to gauge credibility. Under circumstances like the instant case where
the Commission has made causation findings, the court defers to the Labor Commission's
findings because, when reasonably conflicting views arise, it is the Commission's province
to draw inferences, find facts, and reach conclusions on issues of fact. See id. In short,
causation is an issue of fact for the Commission, and "[tjhere is no purpose [for this Court
to] set[] forth all the evidence since [it] do[es] not weigh it." Tintic Standard Mining Co. v.
Industrial Common. 110 P.2d 367, 368 (Utah 1941)
B.

Re-weighing the evidence still results in Ms, Casper failing to prove
medical and legal causation
1.

No Medical Causation

Given the medical testimony and medical panel report, there can be no abuse of
discretion in finding no medical causal link. The ALJ concluded, and the Commission
affirmed, based upon the factual and medical evidence, that Mr. Barraclough suffered from
a preexisting heart condition. Therefore Ms. Casper failed to prove a medical causal link
between Mr. Barraclough's work at Andrus and his death.
Medical causation is obviously determined by medical evidence. See Allen, 729 P.2d
at 22. To establish medical causation, a petitioner must prove by evidence, opinion, or
otherwise, that the stress, strain, or exertion required by the occupation caused the resulting
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injury. See Allen, 729 P.2d at 27. The medical evidence clearly weighed against a causal
connection; and the medical panel concluded, after weighing the medical evidence, that there
was no causal connection. The medical evidence clearly and unambiguously demonstrates
that Mr. Barraclough's heart attack was caused by a preexisting heart condition.
Accordingly, it was certainly not an abuse of discretion for the Commission to conclude that
Petitioner failed to establish medical causation.
There can be no abuse of discretion in concluding that Mr. Barraclough suffered from
a preexisting heart condition given the evidence presented to the ALJ. Evidence at the
hearing indicated that Mr. Barraclough had a prior history of heart problems: he presented
to Dr. Moore with numbness on the left side of his body years before the heart attack; John
Bell testified that Mr. Barraclough told him that Mr. Barraclough experienced chest pains
and numbness on his left side; John Bell also observed Mr. Barraclough experience chest
pains.

Additionally, several days before the accident Mr. Barraclough demonstrated

prodromal symptoms characteristic of a pre-existing cardiac condition: he felt "run down,"
appeared grey or "ashen," "complained of some chest pain," remained in bed and reminisced
about his children, appeared anxious but never admitted to being anxious, looked "very
tired," walked with a "shuffling gait," exhibited unusual behavior in conversing about years
of love and support, and went in to work late. (R. 00418-25, Medical Panel Report.) Dr.
Gray concluded that the underlying cause of the heart attack was developed over a number
of years and could not be ascribed to Mr. Barraclough's employment. (R. 00669:0011-12)
Dr. Perry concluded Mr. Barraclough's employment "had no relationship to the development
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of coronary atherosclerosis, which was the disease responsible for his demise," and
determined that there was "no relationship between [Mr. Barraclough's] employment and his
demise." (R. 00669:0001.) Even Ms. Casper's own expert, Dr. Yanowitz, acknowledged
that "the underlying disease process, artherosclerosis, was likely present for many years[.]"
(R. 00669:0013-14) Dr. McCann analyzed the opinions of the other experts and also
concluded that the heart attack was not caused by Mr. Barraclough's work. (R. 00669:001112) The Medical Panel analyzed all of this medical evidence and concluded that Mr.
Barraclough's heart attack was caused by a preexisting condition. (R. 00418-25, Medical
Panel Report.) Given this well-supported conclusion of the medical panel, Petitioner cannot
legitimately contend that the Commission abused its discretion in finding, based on the
medical evidence, that Mr. Barraclough had a pre-existing heart problem.
Given the evidence of a pre-existing condition, medical testimony that the heart attack
was the result of a pre-existing condition, and the medical panel's conclusion that the heart
attack was caused by a pre-existing condition, the Commission cannot legitimately be
accused of an abuse of discretion in finding no medical causation.
2.

No Legal Causation

There can be no abuse of discretion in finding no legal causal link. The Commission
correctly concluded that Petitioner failed to prove legal causation. The ALJ concluded, and
the Commission affirmed, based upon the factual and medical evidence, that Mr. Barraclough
suffered from a preexisting heart condition. Therefore Ms. Casper failed to prove a legal
causal link between Mr. Barraclough's work at Andrus and his death.
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To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant with a preexisting condition must
show that the employment contributed something substantial to increase the risk he already
faced in everyday life because of the condition. Allen, 729 P.2d at 23. IdL Ms. Casper had
to prove the existence of a physical exertion greater than that undertaken in normal, everyday
life was the cause of death. Ms. Casper failed to meet this burden. She did not claim the
existence of such physical stress, and there is no record evidence of any physical exertion.
Ms. Casper claimed Mr. Barraclough's death was caused by mental stress and anxiety caused
by his work. However, Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
mental stress was sudden and greater than the mental stress encountered in normal, everyday
life was the cause of Mr. Barraclough's death. The evidence was to the contrary. After
receiving medical opinions from the various experts and the medical panel, the Commission
weighed the evidence and concluded that the cause of death was a preexisting heart
condition.
Because Mr. Barraclough suffered from a pre-existing heart condition, Petitioner had
to establish that Mr. Barraclough was exposed to an unusual or extraordinary exertion at
work. Plaintiff failed to meet this burden, and the Commission found that Mr. Barraclough
was not exposed to any extraordinary physical or mental stress at his work. Dr. McCann
noted that "the records contain no evidence that Mr. Barraclough was exposed to any sudden
or extraordinary stress on the day of the event" and stated that Mr. Barraclough's "belief that
he was stressed by the job was not supported by any actual evidence." (R. 00669:0009-10.)
Moreover, Petitioner's own expert acknowledged a preexisting condition and failed to
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present a conclusive opinion, stating that it "is very hard to prove" that stress, not the
preexisting condition, caused the heart attack.

Such evidence did not satisfy Ms. Casper's

burden of demonstrating an unusual or extraordinary stress caused by work, especially in
light of the overwhelming competing testimony and conclusion of the medical panel. It was
certainly not an abuse of discretion for the Commission to conclude that Mr. Barraclough
was not exposed to any extraordinary stress.
III.

Ms. Casper is not entitled to benefits simply because the Workers' Compensation
Act provides a statutory scheme for benefits
As a final point, Petitioner argues she should be awarded benefits because, she insists,

claims are to be "liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits." (Pet. Br. at 14.) This
claim fails to appreciate the fact that Ms. Caper failed to satisfy the statutory requirements
of obtaining benefits. The statute was established to compensate workers for injuries that
both arise out of, and in the course and scope of, employment. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401
(2007). An applicant must prove both (1) legal causation and (2) medical causation. See
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (2007); Allen v. Industrial Common. 729 P.2d 15,25-27 (Utah
1986). As a result of these statutory requirements, the statutory scheme is a contested one.
An injured worker is not compensated for simply making a claim. The statutory scheme
provides a method to adjudicate disputes regarding compensation for benefits. A petitioner
must satisfy the requirements of the Act.

Ms. Casper did not demonstrate, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that she is entitled to benefits under the Act.
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CONCLUSION
The Labor Commission's rejection and dismissal of Petitioner Martha Casper's
application for benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act should be upheld.
Her contention that the untimely responses to requests for admission should be
deemed admitted is contrary to the informality principle recognized by Utah administrative
law. Utah Code Section 34A-2-802 also mandates that administrative discovery is relaxed
and that the Labor Commission is not bound by any formal rules or procedure, including the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; to deem admitted requests for admission would also
contradict this statutory mandate. The Commission properly carried out the spirit of the
Workers' Compensation Act by deciding the matter on the merits, instead of through
technical procedural vehicles. Moreover, no Labor Commission administrative rule has ever
permitted the use of requests for admission as administrative discovery methods. The old
rule permitted interrogatories, and thus other methods including requests for admission were
prohibited. The new administrative rule clarifies the old rule by expressly stating that
requests for admission are prohibited, and because this new rule is procedural rule, it applies
retroactively to render the requests for admission invalid. Furthermore, even if the requests
for admission were deemed admitted, they are not determinative of legal causation and
medical causation. In light of this authority, the Labor Commission did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to deem admitted the requests for admission.
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Ms. Casper's request to overturn the Labor Commission's findings of no legal
causation and no medical causation because she disagrees with the relative weight given to
the competing medical expert opinions on causation is also contrary to Utah law. It is
improper for Ms. Casper to ask this Court to re-weigh evidence, and it is unnecessary for this
Court to do so because Utah law directs that findings of fact made by the Commission after
weighing competing authorities on conflicting evidence are conclusive on the courts. The
finding of no causation is therefore conclusive on this Court. Moreover, re-weighing the
evidence simply validates the decision of the Commission. After weighing the evidence, the
ALJ and the Labor Commission both correctly determined that Ms. Casper is not entitled to
death benefits as a result of Mr. Barraclough's death because Mr. Barraclough's death was
a result of a pre-existing heart condition. As a result, the Labor Commission did not abuse
its discretion in finding no causal link.
Accordingly, Respondents respectfully request that the decision of the Labor
Commission be upheld.

DATED this J__

day of October, 2007.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

CARRIE T. TAYLOR
7T
MICHAEL K. WOOLLEY / ]
Attorneys for Respondent v '
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Addendum A
Utah Administrative Code R602-2-1.H. (October 1997)
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R602. Adjudication.

R602-1. General Provisions.
R602-2. Adjudication of Workers' Compensation and Occupational Disease Claims.
R602-1. General Provisions.
R602-1-1. Time.
R602-1-2. Witness Fees.
R602-1-1. Time.
A. An Order is deemed issued on the date on the face of
the Order which is the date the presiding officer signs the
Order.
B. In computmg any period of time prescribed or allowed
by these rules or by apphcable statute:
1. The day of the act, event, finding, or default, or the
date an Order is issued, shall not be included;
2. The last day of the period so computed shall be
included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a state legal
holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the
next working day;
3. When the period of time prescribed is less t h a n seven
days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and state legal
holidays shall be excluded in the computation;
4. No additional time for mailing will be allowed.
R602-1-2. Witness F e e s .
Each witness who shall appear before t h e Commission
by its order shall receive from the Commission for his/her
attendance fees and mileage as provided for witnesses by
the U t a h Rules of Civil Procedure. Otherwise, each party is
required to subpoena witnesses at their own expense.
R e f e r e n c e s : 34A-1-302, 63-46b-l et seq.
History: 10879, AMD, 08/01/90; 10918, NSC, 07/10/90;
10951, NSC, 07/25/90; 11470, AMD, 02/01/91; 13351, AMD,
10/15/92; 13517, AMD, 12/01/92; 13518, AMD, 12/01/92;
14635, AMD, 08/3y93; 15488, NSC, 03/01/94; 15490, NSC,
03/01/94; 17089, AMD, 08/31/95; 17524, NSC, 01/22/96;
17937, AMD, 10/01/96; 18179, AMD, 12/03/96; 19304, NSC,
07/01/97.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Applicable law.
Rule requiring claimant's industrial accident be a "significant" cause of disability when worker had already
qualified for Social Security benefits and which was promulgated after worker's industrial accident, but before
worker's application for a hearing before the Industrial
Ccamission, could not be applied retroactively. The general rule in workers' compensation cases is t h a t the court is
to apply the law existing at the time of injury. (Former
B490-1-17.) Abel v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 367 (Utah
Jt. App. 1993).
R602-2. Adjudication of Workers' C o m p e n s a t i o n and
Occupational Disease Claims.
K602-2-1.
R602-2-2.
R602-2-3.
R602-2-4.
R602-2-5.

Pie -dings and Discovery.
Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel.
Compensation for Medical Testimony.
Attorney Fees.
Settlement Agreements.

R602-2-1. P l e a d i n g s and Discovery.
A. For the purposes of this rule, "Commission" means the
Labor Commission. "Division" means the Division of Adjudication within the Labor Commission. Adjudicative pro-
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ceedings for workers' compensation and occupational disease claims may be commenced by the injured worker or
dependent filing a request for agency action with the
Commission. The Administrative Law Judge is afforded
discretion in allowing intervention of other parties pursuant to Section 63-46b-9. The Application for Hearing is the
request for agency action. All such applications shall include supporting medical documentation of the claim
where there is a dispute over medical issues. Applications
without supporting documentation will not be mailed to
the employer or insurance carrier for answer until the
appropriate documents have been provided.
B. Whenever a claim for compensation benefits is denied
by an employer or insurance carrier, the burden rests on
the applicant to'initiate the action by filing an Application
for Hearing with the Commission.
C. When an Application for Hearing is filed with the
Commission, the Commission shall forthwith mail a copy
to the employer or to the employer's insurance carrier.
D. The employer or insurance carrier shall have 30 days
following the date of the mailing of the application to file a
written answer with the Commission, admitting or denying liability for the claim. The answer shall state all
affirmative defenses with sufficient accuracy and detail
t h a t an applicant may be fully informed of the n a t u r e of the
defense asserted. All answers shall include a summary and
categorization of benefits paid to date on the claim. A copy
shall be sent to the applicant or, if there is one, to t h e
applicant's attorney by the defendant.
E. When an employer or insurance carrier fails to file an
answer within the 30 days provided above?, the Commission
may enter a default against such employer or insurance
carrier. The Commission may then set the matter for
hearing, take evidence bearing on the claim, and enter an
Order based on the evidence presented. Such defaults may
be set aside by following the procedure outlined in the
U t a h Rules of Civil Procedure. Said default shall apply to
the defendant employer or insurance caixier and may not
be construed to deprive the Employers' Iteinsurance Fund
or the Uninsured Employers' Fund of any appropriate
defenses.
F. When the answer denies liability solely on the medical
aspects of the case, the applicant, through his/her attorney
or agent, and the employer or insurance carrier, with the
approval of the Commission or its representative, may
enter into a stipulated set of facts, which stipulation,
together with the medical documents bearing on the case
in the Commission's file, may be used in making the final
determination of liability.
G. When deemed appropriate, the Commission or its
representatives may have a pre-hearing or post-hearing
conference.
H. Upon filing of the Answer, the defendant may commence discovery with appropriate sets of interrogatories.
Such discovery should focus on the accident event, witnesses, as well as past and present medical care. The
defendant shall also be entitled to appropriately signed
medical releases to allow gathering of pertinent medical
records. The defendant may also require the applicant to
submit to a medical examination by a physiciaji of the
defendant's choice. Failure of a n applicant to comply with
such requests may result in the dismissal of a claim or a
delay in the scheduling of a hearing.
I. Commission subpoena forms shall be used in all
discovery proceedings and shall be signed, unless good
cause is shown for a shorter period, a t least one week prior
to any scheduled hearing.
J . All medical records shall be filed by the employer or its
insurance carrier as a single joint exhibit a t least one week
before the scheduled hearing. Claimant must cooperate
and submit all pertinent medical records contained in
his/her file to the employer or its insurance carrier for the
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joint exhibit submission two weeks in advance of a scheduled hearing. Exhibits are to be placed in an indexed
binder arranged by care provider in chronological order.
Exhibits shall include all relevant treatment records which
t e n d to prove or disprove a fact in issue. Pages shall be
numbered consecutively. Hospital nurses' notes, duplicate
materials, and other non-relevant materials may not be
included.
K. The Administrative Law Judge shall be notified one
week in advance of any proceeding when it is anticipated
t h a t more t h a n four witnesses will be called, or where it is
anticipated that the hearing of the evidence will require
more than two hours.
L. Decisions of the presiding officer in any adjudicative
proceeding shall be issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 63-46b-5 or 63-46b-10.
M. Any party to a n adjudicative proceeding seeking
review of an Order by the Agency may file a written request
for review in accordance with the provisions of Sections
63-46b-12 through 16. A Motion for Review of any Order
entered by an Administrative Law Judge may be filed
p u r s u a n t to the provisions of Section 63-46b-12. Unless so
filed, the Order shall become the award of the Commission
a n d shall be final. If appropriately filed, the Administrative
Law Judge shall:
1. Reopen the case and enter a Supplemental Order after
holding such further hearing and receiving such further
evidence as may be deemed necessary,
2. Amend or modify the prior Order by a Supplemental
order, or
3. Refer the entire case for review under Section 34A-2801.
If the Administrative Law Judge enters a Supplemental
Order, as provided in this subsection, it shall be final
unless a Motion for Review of the same is filed.
N. In formal adjudicative proceedings, the Division shall
generally follow the U t a h Rules of Civil Procedure regarding discovery and t h e issuance of subpoenas, except as the
U t a h Rules of Civil Procedure are modified by the express
provisions of Section 34A-1-802, or as may be otherwise
modified by the presiding officer.
0 . A request for reconsideration of an Order on Motion
for Review may be allowed and shall be governed by the
provisions of Section 63-46b-13. Any petition for judicial
review of final agency action shall be governed by the
provisions of Section 63-46b-14.
R602-2-2. G u i d e l i n e s for Utilization of Medical
Panel.
Pursuant to Section 34A-2-601, the Commission adopts
t h e following guidelines in detennining the necessity of
submitting a case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law
Judge where:
1. One or more significant medical issues may be involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be
shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant medical
issues are involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical
impairment which vary more t h a n 5% of the whole person,
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total
cutoff date which vary more than 90 days, and/or
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more
t h a n $2,000.
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be
scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel report.
Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting medical
evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a
hearing, re-submit the new evidence to tike panel for
consideration and clarification.
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C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an
injured worker to be examined by another physician for the
purpose of obtaining a further medical examination or
evaluation pertaining to the medical issues involved, and
to obtain a report addressing these medical issues in all
cases where:
1. The treating physician h a s failed or refused to give an
impairment rating,
2. The employer or doctor considers ti^° claim to be
non-industrial, and/or
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such further
evaluation.
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical
panel or medical consultant and of their appearance a t a
hearing, as well as any expenses for further medical
examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative Law Judge, shall be paid out of either the "^^lployers'
Reinsurance Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund, as
directed by Section 34A-2-601.
R602-2-3. C o m p e n s a t i o n for Medical Testimony.
Compensation for medical panel examination, medical
testimony, and preparation by medical panel members at
hearings shall be $75 per half hour and shall be $S7.50 per
half hour for the medical panel chair.
R602-2-4. Attorney F e e s .
Pursuant to Section 34A-1-309, the Commission adopts
the following rule to regulate and fix reasonable fees for
attorneys representing applicants before the Commission
in all cases wherein such fees are awarded after December
31, 1991.
A. The concept of a contingency fee is recognized. A
retainer in advance of a Commission approved fee is not
allowed. Benefits are only deemed generated within the
meaning of this rule when they are paid as a result of legal
services rendered after a n Appointment of Counsel form is
signed by the applicant. A copy of this form must be filed
with the Commission by the claimant's attorney.
B. By creating this rule, the commission does not intend
that an applicant's attorney be paid a fee where the
assistance the attorney renders involves only an incidental
expenditure of time. For example, no attorney's fee shall be
paid when compensation agreements are merely reviewed,
simple documents such as Protection of Rights forms are
prepared, or an apparent dispute is quickly resolved as a
result of oral or written communication.
C. "Benefits" within the meaning of this rule shall be
limited to weekly death or disability compensation and
accrued interest thereon paid to or on behalf of an applicant pursuant to t h e terms of Title 34A, U t a h Code
Annotated.
D. An attorney's fee deducted from the benefits generated shall be awarded for all legal services rendered
through final Commission action with the following constraints:
1. 20% of weekly benefits generated for the first $15,000,
plus 15% of the weekly benefits generated in excess of
$15,000 but not exceeding $30,000, plus 10% of the weekly
benefits generated in excess of $30,000.
2. In no case shall an attorney collect fees calculated on
more than the first 312 weeks of any and all combinations
of workers' compensation benefits.
3. Not withstanding t h e above, in no case shall the
maximum fee exceed $7,500.
E. After either successfully prosecuting or defending an
appeal following final Commission action, an increased
attorney's fee shall be awarded amounting to:
1.25% of the benefits in dispute before the Utah Court of
Appeals, plus the amount awarded in part D of this rule,
not to exceed $11,000.
2. 30% of the benefits in dispute before the Supreme
Court, plus the amount awarded in part D of this rule, plus
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R602-1. G e n e r a l P r o v i s i o n s .
R602-1-1. Time.
R602-1-2. Witness Fees.
R602-1-1. Time.
A. An Order is deemed issued on the date on the face
of the Order which is the date the presiding officer
signs the Order.
B. In computing any period of time prescribed or
allowed by these rules or by applicable statute:
1. The day of the act, event, finding, or default, or
the date an Order is issued, shall not be included;
2. The last day of the period so computed shall be
included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a state
legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the
end of the next working day;
3. When the period of time prescribed is less t h a n
seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and
state legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation;
4. No additional time for mailing will be allowed.
R602-1-2. Witness F e e s .
Each witness who shall appear before the Commission by its order shall receive from the Commission for
his/her attendance fees and mileage as provided for
witnesses by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Otherwise, each party is required to subpoena witnesses
at their own expense.
References: 34A-1-302, 63-46b-l et seq.
History: 10879, AMD, 08/01/90; 10918, NSC,
07/10/90; 10951, NSC, 07/25/90; 11470, AMD,
02/01/91; 13351, AMD, 10/15/92; 13517, AMD,
12/01/92; 13518, AMD, 12/01/92; 14635, AMD,
08/31/93; 15488, NSC, 03/01/94; 15490, NSC,
03/01/94; 17089, AMD, 08/31/95; 17524, NSC,
01/22/96; 17937, AMD, 10/01/96; 18179, AMD,
12/03/96; 19304, NSC, 07/01/97; 20258, 5YR, 11/24/97.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Applicable law.
Rule requiring claimant's industrial accident be a
"significant" cause of disability when worker had
already qualified for Social Security benefits and
which was promulgated after worker's industrial accident, but before worker's application for a hearing
before the Industrial Commission, could not be applied retroactively. The general rule in workers' compensation cases is t h a t the court is to apply the law
existing at the time of injury. (Former R490-1-17.)
Abel v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 R2d 367 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993).
R602-2. Adjudication of Workers' C o m p e n s a t i o n
a n d Occupational D i s e a s e Claims.
R602-2-1.
R602-2-2.
T>anel.
R602-2-3.
R602-2-4.
R602-2-5.

Pleadings and Discovery.
Guidelines for Utilization

of

Medical

Compensation for Medical Testimony.
Attorney Fees.
Settlement Agreements.

R602-2-1. P l e a d i n g s a n d Discovery.
A. For the purposes of this rule, "Commission"
means the Labor Commission. "Division" means the
Division of Adjudication within the Labor Commis-
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sion. Adjudicative proceedings for workers' compensation and occupational disease claims may be commenced by the injured worker or dependent filing a
request for agency action with the Commission. The
Administrative Law Judge is afforded discretion in
allowing intervention of other parties pursuant to
Section 63-46b-9. The Application for Hearing is the
request for agency action. All such applications shall
include supporting medical documentation of the
claim where there is a dispute over medical issues.
Applications without supporting documentation will
not be mailed to the employer or insurance carrier for
answer until the appropriate documents have been
provided.
B. Whenever a claim for compensation benefits is
denied by an employer or insurance carrier, the burden rests on the applicant to initiate the action by
filing an Application for Hearing with the Commission.
C. When an Application for Hearing is filed with the
Commission, the Commission shall forthwith mail a
copy to the employer or to the employer's insurance
carrier.
D. The employer or insurance carrier shall have 30
days following the date of the mailing of the application to file a written answer with the Commission,
admitting or denying liability for the claim. The
answer shall state all affirmative defenses with sufficient accuracy and detail t h a t an applicant may be
fully informed of the n a t u r e of the defense asserted.
All answers shall include a summary and categorization of benefits paid to date on the claim. A copy shall
be sent to the applicant or, if there is one, to t h e
applicant's attorney by the defendant.
E. When an employer or insurance carrier fails to
file an answer within the 30 days provided above, the
Commission may enter a default against such employer or insurance carrier. The Commission may
then set the matter for hearing, take evidence bearing
on the claim, and enter an Order based on the evidence presented. Such defaults msiy be set aside by
following the procedure outlined in the U t a h Rules of
Civil Procedure. Said default shall apply to the defendant employer or insurance carrier and may not be
construed to deprive the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund of any appropriate defenses.
F. When the answer denies liability solely on the
medical aspects of the case, the applicant, through
his/her attorney or agent, and the employer or insurance carrier, with the approval of the Commission or
its representative, may enter into a stipulated set of
facts, which stipulation, together with the medical
documents bearing on the case in the Commission's
file, may be used in making the final determination of
liability.
G. When deemed appropriate, the Commission or
its representatives may have a pre-hearing or posthearing conference.
H. Upon filing of the Answer, the defendant may
commence discovery with appropriate sets of interrogatories. Such discovery should focus on the accident event, witnesses, as well as past and present
medical care. The defendant shall also be entitled to
appropriately signed medical releases to allow gathering of pertinent medical records. The defendant
may also require the applicant to submit to a medical
examination by a physician of the defendant's choice.
Failure of an applicant to comply with such requests
may result in the dismissal of a claim or a delay in the
scheduling of a hearing.
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I. Commission subpoena forms shall be used in all
discovery proceedings and shall be signed, unless good
cause is shown for a shorter period, at least one week
prior to any scheduled hearing.
J. All medical records shall be filed by the employer
or its insurance carrier as a single joint exhibit at
least one week before the scheduled hearing. Claimant must cooperate and submit all pertinent medical
records contained in his/her file to the employer or its
insurance carrier for the joint exhibit submission two
weeks in advance of a scheduled hearing. Exhibits are
to be placed in an indexed binder arranged by care
provider in chronological order. Exhibits shall include
all relevant treatment records which tend to prove or
disprove a fact\in issue. Pages shall be numbered
consecutively Hospital nurses' notes, duplicate materials, and other non-relevant materials may not be
included.
K. The Administrative Law Judge shall be notified
one week in advance of any proceeding when it is
anticipated that more t h a n four witnesses will be
called, or where it is anticipated that the hearing of
the evidence will require more than two hours.
L. Decisions of the presiding officer in any adjudicative proceeding shall be issued in accordance with
the provisions of Section 63-46b-5 or 63-46b-10.
M. Any party to an adjudicative proceeding may
obtain review of an Order issued by an Administrative
Law Judge by filing a written request for review with
the Adjudication Division in accordance with the
provisions of Section 63-46b-12 and Section 34A-1303. Unless a request for review is properly filed, the
Administrative Law Judge's Order is the final order of
the Commission. If a request for review is filed, other
parties to the adjudicative proceeding may file a
response within 20 calendar days of the date the
request for review was filed. Thereafter, the Administrative Law Judge shall:
1. Reopen the case and enter a Supplemental Order
after holding such further hearing and receiving such
further evidence as may be deemed necessary,
2. Amend or modify the prior Order by a Supplemental order, or
3. Refer the entire case for review under Section
34A-2-801.
If the Administrative Law Judge enters a Supplemental Order, as provided in this subsection, it shall
be final unless a request for review of the same is filed.
N. In formal adjudicative proceedings, the Division
shall generally follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding discovery and the issuance of subpoenas, except as the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are
modified by the express provisions of Section 34 A-1802, or as may be otherwise modified by the presiding
officer.
0 . A request for reconsideration of an Order on
Motion for Review may be allowed and shall be
governed by the provisions of Section 63-46b-13. Any
petition for judicial review of final agency action shall
be governed by the provisions of Section 63-46b-14.
R602-2-2. Guidelines for Utilization of Medical
Panel.
P u r s u a n t to Section 34A-2-601, the Commission
adopts the following guidelines in determining the
necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative
Law Judge where:
1. One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must

be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant
medical issues are involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole
person,
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary
total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days, and/or
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to
more than $2,000.
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may
be scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel
report. Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting medical evidence, the Administrative Law
Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, re-submit the new
evidence to the panel for consideration and clarification.
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an
injured worker to be examined by another physician
for the purpose of obtaining a further medical examination or evaluation pertaining to the medical issues
involved, and to obtain a report addressing these
medical issues in all cases where:
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to
give an impairment rating,
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be
non-industrial, and/or
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such
further evaluation.
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical
panel or medical consultant and of their appearance
at a hearing, as well as any expenses for further
medical examination or evaluation^ as directed by the
Administrative Law Judge, shall be paid out of either
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund or the Uninsured
Employers' Fund, as directed by Section 34A-2-601.
R602-2-3. Compensation for Medical Testimony.
Compensation for medical panel examination,
medical testimony, and preparation by medical panel
members at hearings shall be $75 per half hour and
shall be $87.50 per half hour for the medical panel
chair.
R602-2-4. Attorney F e e s .
Pursuant to Section 34A-1-309, the Commission
adopts the following rule to regulate and fix reasonable fees for attorneys representing applicants before
the Commission in all cases wherein such fees are
awarded after April 2, 1999.
A. The concept of a contingency fee is recognized. A
retainer in advance of a Commission approved fee is
not allowed. Benefits are only deemed generated
within the meaning of this rule when they are paid as
a result of legal services rendered after an Appointment of Counsel form is signed by the applicant. A
copy of this form must be filed with the Commission
by the claimant's attorney.
B. By creating this rule, the commission does not
intend that an applicant's attorney be paid a fee
where the assistance the attorney renders involves
only an incidental expenditure of time. For example,
no attorney's fee shall be paid when compensation
agreements are merely reviewed, simple documents
such as Protection of Rights forms are prepared, or an
apparent dispute is quickly resolved as a result of oral
or written communication.
C. "Benefits" within the meaning of this rule shall
be limited to weekly death or disability compensation
and accrued interest thereon paid to or on behalf of an
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Title 63. State Affairs in General
*iii Chapter 4 6B. Administrative Procedures Act

(Refs & Annos)

-f§ 63-46b-7. Procedures for formal adjudicative p r o c e e d i n g s — D i s c o v e r y
subpoenas

and

(1) In formal adjudicative proceedings, the agency may, by rule, prescribe means
of discovery adequate to permit the parties to obtain all relevant information
necessary to support their claims or defenses.
If the agency does not enact rules
under this section, the parties may conduct discovery according to the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
(2) Subpoenas and other orders to secure the attendance of witnesses or the
production of evidence in formal adjudicative proceedings shall be issued by the
presiding officer when requested by any party, or may be issued by the presiding
officer on his own motion.
(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes any investigative right or
power given to an agency by another statute.
Laws 1987, c. 161, § 263.
CROSS REFERENCES
Discovery, see Rules Civ. P r o c , Rule 26 et seq.
Labor commission, adjudicative proceedings, see § 34A-1-302.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Administrative Law and Procedure C^>4 64 to 4 66.
Westlaw Key Number Searches:
15Ak464 to 15Ak466.
C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure §§ 124 to 131.
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
Subpoena of persons in foreign country, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1783.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
In general 1
1. In general
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When an administrative agency determines that a party has not complied with
legitimate discovery requests due to willfulness, bad faith, fault, or persistent
dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial piocess, the agency acts within its
discretion m imposing sanctions. Joseph v Salt Lake City Civil Service Com'n,
2002, 53 P.3d 11, 452 Utah Adv. Rep. 43, 2002 UT App 254, certiorari denied 63
P.3d 104, certiorari denied 124 S.Ct. 133, 540 U.S. 821, 157 L.Ed.2d 40
Administrative Law And Procedure C^> 4 66
The choice of an appropriate discovery sanction including the entry of default
against the noncomplymg party is primarily the responsibility of an
administrative agency. Joseph v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Com'n, 2002, 53
P.3d 11, 452 Utah Adv. Rep. 43, 2002 UT App 254, certiorari denied 63 P 3d 104,
certiorari denied 124 S.Ct. 133, 540 U.S. 821, 157 L.Ed.2d 40. Administrative Law
And Procedure €=> 4 66
An administrative agency is not required to issue an order compelling discovery
prior to considering sanctions; it is enough that a notice of the taking of a
deposition or a request for inspection has been properly served on the party.
Joseph v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Com'n, 2002, 53 P.3d 11, 452 Utah Adv. Rep.
43, 2002 UT App 254, certiorari denied 63 P 3d 104, certiorari denied 124 S.Ct.
133, 540 U.S. 821, 157 L.Ed.2d 40. Administrative Law And Procedure €^^ 466
Discovery in administrative proceedings is available only if governing statutes or
agency rules so provide. Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 1996, 916 P.2d 344
Administrative Law And Procedure €=> 4 66
U.C.A. 1953 § 63-46b-7, UT ST § 63-46b-7

Current through 2007 First Special Session.
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UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
LABOR COMMISSION
R602. ADJUDICATION.
Copr. (C) 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
Current with amendments included in the Utah State Bulletin,
Number 2007-16, dated August 15, 2007.
R602-2. Adjudication of Workers' Compensation and Occupational Disease Claims.
AUTHORITY AND SOURCE
KEY: workers' compensation, administrative procedures, hearings, settlements
Date of Enactment or Last Substantive Amendment
2007
Notice of Continuation September 5, 2002
Authorizing, and Implemented or Interpreted Law
34A-1-301 et seq.; 63-46b-l et seq.
R602-2-1. Pleadings and discovery
A. Definitions.
1. "Commission" means the Labor Commission.
2. "Division" means the Division of Adjudication within the Labor Commission.
3. "Application for Hearing" means the request for agency action regarding a workers' compensation claim.
4. "Supporting medical documentation" means a Summary of Medical Record or other medical report or
treatment note completed by a physician that indicates the presence or absence of a medical causal connection
between benefits sought and the alleged industrial injury.
5. "Authorization to Release Medical Records" is a form authorizing the injured workers' medical providers to
provide medical records and other medical information to the commission or a party.
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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6 "Supporting documents" means supporting medical documentation, list of medical pro\ iders, Authorization
to Release Medical Records and, when applicable, an Appointment of Counsel Form
7 "Petitioner" means the person or entity who has filed an Application for Hearing
8 "Respondent" means the person or entity against whom the Application for Hearing was filed
9 "Discovery motion" includes a motion to compel or a motion for protective order
B Application foi Hearing
1 Whenever a claim for compensation benefits is denied by an employer or insurance earner, the burden rests
with the injured worker, or medical provider, to initiate agency action by filing an Application for Heanng
with the Division Applications for hearing shall include an original, notarized Authorization to Release
Medical Records
2 An employer, insurance carrier, or any other party with standing under the Workers' Compensation Act may
obtain a hearing before the Adjudication Division by filing a request for agency action with the Division
3 All Applications for Hearing shall include any available supporting medical documeatation of the claim
where there is a dispute over medical issues Applications for Hearing without supporting documentation and a
properly completed Authorization to Release Medical Records may not be mailed to the employer or insurance
earner for answer until the appropnate documents have been provided In addition to respondent's answer, a
respondent may file a motion to dismiss the Application for Heanng where there is no supporting medical
documentation filed to demonstrate medical causation when such is at issue between the parties
4 When an Application for Hearing with appropriate supporting documentation is filed with the Division, the
Division shall forthwith mail to the respondents a copy of the Application for Hearing, supporting documents
and Notice of Formal Adjudication and Order for Answer
5 In cases where the injured worker is represented by an attorney, a completed and signed Appointment of
Counsel form shall be filed with the Application for Hearing or upon retention of the attorney
C Answer
1 The respondent(s) shall have 30 days from the date of mailing of the Order for Answer, to file a written
answer to the Application for Heanng
2 The answer shall admit or deny liability for the claim and shall state the reasons liability is denied The
answer shall state all affirmative defenses with sufficient accuracy and detail that the petitioner and the
Division may be fully informed of the nature and substance of the defenses asserted
3 All answers shall include a summary of benefits which have been paid to date on the claim, designating such
payments by category, l e medical expenses, temporary total disability, permanent partial disability, etc
4 When liability is denied based upon medical issues, copies of all available medical reports sufficient to
support the denial of liability shall be filed with the answer
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5 If the answer filed by the respondents fails to sufficiently explain the basis of the denial, fails to include
available medical reports or records to support the denial, or contains affirmative defenses without sufficient
factual detail to support the affirmative defense, the Division may strike the answer filed and order the
respondent to file withm 20 days, a new answer which conforms with the requirements of this rule
6 All answers must state whether the respondent is willing to mediate the claim
7 Petitioners are allowed to timely amend the Application for Hearing, and respondents are allowed to timely
amend the answer, as newly discovered information becomes available that would warrant the amendment
The parties shall not amend their pleadings later than 45 days prior to the scheduled hearing without leave of
the Administrative Law Judge
8 Responses and answers to amended pleadings shall be filed within ten days of service of the amended
pleading without further order of the Labor Commission
D Default
1 If a respondent fails to file an answer as provided in Subsection C above, the Division may enter a default
against the respondent
2 If default is entered against a respondent, the Division may conduct any further proceedings necessary to
take evidence and determine the issues raised by the Application for Hearing without the participation of the
party m default pursuant to Section 63-46b-l 1(4), Utah Code
3 A default of a respondent shall not be construed to deprive the Employer's Reinsurance Fund or Uninsured
Employers' Fund of any appropriate defenses
4 The defaulted party may file a motion to set aside the default under the procedures set forth m Section
63-46b-ll(3), Utah Code The Adjudication Division shall set aside defaults upon written and signed
stipulation of all parties to the action
E Waiver of Hearing
1 The parties may, with the approval of the administrative law judge, waive their right to a hearing and enter
into a stipulated set of facts, which may be submitted to the administrative law judge The administrative law
judge may use the stipulated facts, medical records and evidence in the record to make a final determination of
liability or refer the matter to a Medical Panel for consideration of the medical issues pursuant to R602-2-2
2 Stipulated facts shall include sufficient facts to address all the issues raised in the Application for Hearing
and answer
3 In cases where Medical Panel review is required, the administrative law judge may forward the evidence m
the record, including but not limited to, medical records, fact stipulations, radiographs and deposition
transcripts, to a medical panel for assistance in resolving the medical issues
F Discovery
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1 Upon filing the answer, the respondent and the petitioner may commence discovery Discovery allowed
under this rule may include interrogatories, requests for production of documents, depositions, and medical
examinations Discovery shall not include requests for admissions Appropriate discovery under this rule shall
focus on matters relevant to the claims and defenses at issue in the case All discovery requests are deemed
continuing and shall be promptly supplemented by the responding party as information comes available
2 Without leave of the administrative law judge, or written stipulation, any party may serve upon any other
party written interrogatories, not exceeding 25 m number, including all discrete subparts, to be answered by
the party served The frequency or extent of use of interrogatories, requests for production of documents,
medical examinations and/or depositions shall be limited by the administrative law judge if it is determined
that
a The discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from another source
that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive,
b The party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the
discovery sought, or
c The discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in
the adjudication
3 Upon reasonable notice, the respondent may require the petitioner to submit to a medical exammation by a
physician of the respondent's choice
4 All parties may conduct depositions pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 34A-1-308,
Utah Code
5 Requests for production of documents are allowed, but limited to matters relevant to the claims and defenses
at issue in the case, and shall not include requests for documents provided with the petitioner's Application for
Hearing, nor the respondents' answer
6 Parties shall diligently pursue discovery so as not to delay the adjudication of the claim If a hearing has
been scheduled, discovery motions shall be filed no later than 45 days prior to the hearing unless leave of the
administrative law judge is obtained
7 Discovery motions shall contain copies of all relevant documents pertaining to the discovery at issue, such
as mailing certificates and follow up requests for discovery The responding party shall have 10 days from the
date the discovery motion is mailed to file a response to the discovery motion
8 Parties conducting discovery under this rule shall maintain mailing certificates and follow up letters
regarding discovery to submit in the event Division intervention is necessary to complete discovery Discovery
documents shall not be filed with the Division at the time they are forwarded to opposing parties
9 Any party who fails to obey an administrative law judge's discovery order shall be subject to the sanctions
available under Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
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G Subpoenas
1 Commission subpoena forms shall be used in all discovery proceedings to compel the attendance of
witnesses All subpoenas shall be signed by the administrative law judge assigned to the case, or the duty
judge where the assigned judge is not available Subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses shall be
served at least 14 days prior to the hearing consistent with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 45 Witness fees and
mileage shall be paid by the party which subpoenas the witness
2 A subpoena to produce records shall be served on the holder of the record at least 14 days prior to the date
specified m the subpoena as provided in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 45 All fees associated with the
production of documents shall be paid by the party which subpoenas the record
H Medical Records Exhibit
1 The parties are expected to exchange medical records during the discovery period
2 Petitioner shall submit all relevant medical records contained in his/her possession to the respondent for the
preparation of a joint medical records exhibit at least twenty (20) working days prior to the scheduled hearing
3 The respondent shall prepare a joint medical record exhibit contaimng all relevant medical records The
medical record exhibit shall include all relevant treatment records that tend to prove or disprove a fact in issue
Hospital nurses' notes, duplicate materials, and other non-relevant materials need not be included in the
medical record exhibit
4 The medical records shall be indexed, paginated, arranged by medical care provider m chronological order
and bound
5 The medical record exhibit prepared by the respondent shall be delivered to the Division and the petitioner
or petitioner's counsel at least ten (10) working days prior to the hearing Late-filed medical records may or
may not be admitted at the discretion of the administrative law judge by stipulation or for good cause shown
6 The administrative law judge may require the respondent to submit an additional copy of the joint medical
record exhibit m cases referred to a medical panel
7 The petitioner is responsible to obtain radiographs and diagnostic films for review by the medical panel
The administrative law judge shall issue subpoenas where necessary to obtain radiology films
I Hearing
1 Notices of hearing shall be mailed to the addresses of record of the parties The parties shall provide current
addresses to the Division for receipt of notices or risk the entry of default and loss of the opportunity to
participate at the hearing
2 Judgment may be entered without a hearing after default is entered or upon stipulation and waiver of a
hearing by the parties
3 No later than 45 days pnor to the scheduled hearing, all parties shall file a signed pretrial disclosure form
that identifies (1) fact witnesses the parties actually intend to call at the hearing, (2) expert witnesses the
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parties actually intend to call at the hearing, (3) language translator the parties intend to use at the hearing, (4)
exhibits, including reports, the parties intend to offer in evidence at the hearing, (5) the specific benefits or
relief claimed by the petitioner, (6) the specific defenses that the respondent actually intends to litigate, (7)
whether, or not, a party anticipates that the case will take more than four hours of hearing time, (8) the job
categories or titles the respondents claim the petitioner is capable of performing if the claim is for permanent
total disability, and, (9) any other issues that the parties intend to ask the administrative law judge to
adjudicate The administrative law judge may exclude witnesses, exhibits, evidence, claims, or defenses as
appropriate of any party who fails to timely file a signed pre-trial disclosure form as set forth above The
parties shall supplement the pre-trial disclosure form with information that newly becomes available after
filing the original form The pre-trial disclosure form does not replace other discovery allowed under these
rules.
4 If the petitioner requires the services of language translation during the hearing, the petitioner has the
obligation of providing a person who can translate between the petitioner's native language and English during
the hearing If the respondents are dissatisfied with the proposed translator identified by the petitioner, the
respondents may provide a qualified translator for the hearing at the respondent's expense
5. The petitioner shall appear at the hearing prepared to outline the benefits sought, such as the periods for
which compensation and medical benefits are sought, the amounts of unpaid medical bills, and a permanent
partial disability rating, if applicable If mileage reimbursement for travel to receive medical care is sought, the
petitioner shall bring documentation of mileage, including the dates, the medical provider seen and the total
mileage.
6 The respondent shall appear at the hearing prepared to address the merits of the petitioner's claim and
provide evidence to support any defenses timely raised
7 Parties are expected to be prepared to present their evidence on the date the hearing is scheduled Requests
for continuances may be granted or denied at the discretion of the administrative law judge for good cause
shown Lack of diligence in preparing for the hearing shall not constitute good cause for a continuance
8 Subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the Labor Commission, the evidentiary record shall be deemed
closed at the conclusion of the hearing, and no additional evidence will be accepted without leave of the
administrative law judge
J Motions-Time to Respond
Responses to all motions other than discovery motions shall be filed withm ten (10) days from the date the motion
was filed with the Division Reply memoranda shall be filed within seven (7) days from the date a response was
filed with the Division.
K. Notices.
1 Orders and notices mailed by the Division to the last address of record provided by a party are deemed
served on that party
2 Where an attorney appears on behalf of a party, notice of an action by the Division serv ed on the attorney is
considered notice to the party represented by the attorney.
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L Form of Decisions
Decisions of the presiding officer in any adjudicative proceeding shall be issued in accordance with the provisions
of Section 63-46b-5 or 63-46b-10, Utah Code
M Motions for Review
1 Any party to an adjudicative proceeding may obtam review of an Order issued by an Administrative Law
Judge by filing a written request for review with the Adjudication Division in accordance with the provisions
of Section 63-46b-12 and Section 34A-1-303, Utah Code Unless a request for review is properly filed, the
Administrative Law Judge's Order is the final order of the Commission If a request for review is filed, other
parties to the adjudicative proceeding may file a response within 20 calendar days of the date the request for
review was filed If such a response is filed, the party filing the original request for review may reply within 10
calendar days of the date the response was filed Thereafter the Administrative Law Judge shall
a Reopen the case and enter a Supplemental Order after holding such further hearing and receiving such
further evidence as may be deemed necessary,
b Amend or modify the prior Order by a Supplemental Order, or
c Refer the entire case for review under Section 34A-2-801, Utah Code
2 If the Administrative Law Judge enters a Supplemental Order, as provided m this subsection, it shall be final
unless a request for review of the same is filed
N Procedural Rules
In formal adjudicative proceedings, the Division shall generally follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
regarding discovery and the issuance of subpoenas, except as the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are modified by
the express provisions of Section 34A-2-802, Utah Code or as may be otherwise modified by these rules
O Requests for Reconsideration and Petitions for Judicial Review
A request for reconsideration of an Order on Motion for Review may be allowed and shall be governed by the
provisions of Section 63-46b-13, Utah Code Any petition for judicial review of final agency action shall be
governed by the provisions of Section 63-46b-14, Utah Code
CREDIT(S)
History Note Amended effective January 2, 2004, amended effective 5/5/2006
R602-2-2 Guidelines for utilization of medical panel
Pursuant to Section 34A-2-601, the Commission adopts the following guidelines in determining the necessity of
submitting a case to a medical panel
A A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge where one or more significant medical issues may be
involved Generally a significant medical issue must be shown by conflicting medical reports Significant medical
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issues are involved when there are
1 Conflicting medical opinions related to causation of the injury or disease,
2 Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole
person,
3 Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days,
4 Conflicting medical opinions related to a claim of permanent total disability, and/or
5 Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more than $10,000
B A hearing on objections to the panel report may be scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel report Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting
medical evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, re-submit the new evidence to the panel
for consideration and clarification
C The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured worker to be examined by another physician for the
purpose of obtaming a further medical examination or evaluation pertaining to the medical issues involved, and to
obtain a report addressing these medical issues in all cases where
1 The treating physician has failed or refused to give an impairment rating, and/or
2 A substantial injustice may occur without such further evaluation
D Any expenses of the study and report of a medical panel or medical consultant and of their appearance at a
hearing, as well as any expenses for further medical examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative
Law Judge, shall be paid from the Uninsured Employers' Fund, as directed by Section 34A-2-601
R602-2-3 Compensation for Medical Panel Services
Compensation for medical panel services, including records review, examination, report preparation and testimony,
shall be $112 50 per half hour and for medical panel members and $125 per half hour for the medical panel chair
CREDIT(S)
Amended effective November 15, 2005
R602-2-4 Attorney Fees
A Pursuant to Section 34A-1-309, the Commission adopts the following rule to regulate and fix reasonable fees for
attorneys representing applicants in workers' compensation or occupational illness claims
1 This rule applies to all fees awarded after July 1, 2007
2 Fees awarded prior to the effective date of this rule are determined according to the prior version of this rule
m effect on the date of the award
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B Upon written agreement, when an attorney's services are limited to consultation, document preparation,
document review, or review of settlement proposals, the attorney may charge the applicant an hourly fee of not
more than $125 for time actually spent in providing such services, up to a maximum of four hours
1 Commission approval is not required for attorneys fees charged under this subsection B It is the applicant's
responsibility to pay attorneys fees permitted by this subsection B
2 In all other cases involving payment of applicants' attorneys fees which are not covered by this subsection
B , the entire amount of such attorneys fees are subject to subsection C or D of this rule
C Except for legal services compensated under subsection B of this rule, all legal services provided to applicants
shall be compensated on a contingent fee basis
1 For purposes of this subsection C , the following definitions and limitations apply
a The term "benefits" includes only death or disability compensation and interest accrued thereon
b Benefits are "generated" when paid as a result of legal services rendered after an Appointment of
Counsel form is signed by the applicant A copy of this form must be filed with the Commission by the
applicant's attorney
c In no case shall an attorney collect fees calculated on more than the first 312 weeks of any and all
combinations of workers' compensation benefits
2 Fees and costs authonzed by this subsection shall be deducted from the applicant's benefits and paid directly
to the attorney on order of the Commission A retainer m advance of a Commission approved fee is not
allowed
3 Attorney fees for benefits generated by the attorney's services shall be computed as follows
a For all legal services rendered through final Commission action, the fee shall be 20% of weekly benefits
generated for the first $24,275, plus 15% of the weekly benefits generated m excess of $24,275 but not
exceeding $48,550, plus 10% of the weekly benefits generated in excess of $48,550, to a maximum of
$12,250
b For legal services rendered m prosecuting or defending an appeal before the Utah Court of Appeals, an
attorney's fee shall be awarded amounting to 25% of the benefits m dispute before the Court of Appeals
This amount shall be added to any attorney's fee awarded under subsection C 3 a for benefits not in
dispute before the Court of Appeals The total amount of fees awarded under subsection C 3 a and this
subsection C 3 b shall not exceed $17,900,
c For legal services rendered in prosecuting or defending an appeal before the Utah Supreme Court, an
attorney's fee shall be awarded amounting to 30% of the benefits in dispute before the Supreme Court
This amount shall be added to any attorney's fee awarded under subsection C 3 a and subsection C 3 b
for benefits not in dispute before the Supreme Court The total amount of fees awarded under subsection
C 3 a, subsection C 3 b and this subsection C 3 c shall not exceed $23,550
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4 In addition to attorneys fees authorized by this subsection, a prevailing applicant's attorney shall be awarded
reasonable and necessary costs actually incurred in the prosecution of the applicant's claim, as determined by
the ALJ
D In "medical only" cases in which awards of attorneys' fees are authorized by Subsection 34A-1-309(4), the
amount of such fees and costs shall be computed according to the provisions of subsection C
CREDIT(S)
History Note Amended effective December 2, 2004, amended effective 7/24/07
R602-2-5 Settlement agreements
A Statutory authority
Section 34A-2-420 requires the Commission to review all agreements for the settlement or commutation of claims
for workers' compensation or occupational disease benefits and grants the Commission discretion to approve such
agreements The Commission's authority under Section 34A-2-420 applies to all claims arising under the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act or Occupational Disease Act, regardless of the date of accident or occupational
disease This rule sets forth the requirements for Commission approval of such agreements
B General Considerations
Settlement agreements may be appropriate in claims of disputed validity or when the parties' interests are served by
payment of benefits in a manner different than otherwise prescribed by the workers' compensation laws However,
settlement agreements must also fulfill the underlying purposes of the workers' compensation laws Once approved
by the Commission, settlement agreements are permanently binding on the parties The Commission will not
approve any proposed settlement that is manifestly unjust
C Procedure
1 Parties interested m a present or potential workers' compensation claim, whether or not an application for
heanng has been filed, may submit their settlement agreement to the Commission for review and approval The
Commission may delegate its authority to review and approve such agreements
2 Each settlement agreement shall be in writing, executed by each party and such party's attorney, if any, and
shall include a proposed order for Commission approval of the agreement
3 Each settlement agreement shall set forth the nature of the claim being settled and what claims are in
dispute, if any
4 Each settlement agreement shall contain a statement that each party understands that the agreement is
permanent, binding and constitutes full and final settlement of any right the claimant may otherwise have to
future benefits, including medical benefits The Commission may establish an approved form for complying
with the foregoing disclosure requirement
5 Attorneys' fees shall be allowed as provided by Rule R602-2-4 Each settlement agreement shall describe
the amount to be paid to claimant's counsel as attorney's fees and costs, the manner in which such amounts are
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computed and the method of payment thereof.
6. The settlement agreement may provide for payment of benefits through insurance contract or by other third
parties if the Commission determines a) such payment provisions are secure and b) such payment provisions
do not relieve the parties of their underlying liability for payments required by the agreement.
7. Upon receipt of a proposed settlement agreement meeting the requirements of this rule, the Commission
shall review such proposed agreement:
a. As needed, the Commission may contact the parties and others to obtain further information about the
proposed settlement;
b. If the Commission determines that a proposed settlement agreement conforms with this rule, the
Commission shall approve such agreement and notify the parties in writing.
c. If the Commission determines that a proposed settlement agreement does not comply with this rule, the
Commission shall notify the parties in writing of its reasons for rejecting the proposed agreement.
d. The Commission shall retain a record of its action on all settlement agreements submitted to it for
approval.
U.A.C. R602-2, UT ADC R602-2
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